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From Everyday Aesthetics 
to Rethinking Existence
The Possible Dialogue between Jean Luc 
Nancy’s Ontology and the Aesthetics of the Everyday
Natasha Luna Málaga
My aim is to argue that Jean Luc Nancy’s  conception of Being can be particularly valuable for 
underlining Everyday Aesthetics’ specificity and thus for revealing its philosophical worth, one that 
I  believe is overshadowed when treating Everyday Aesthetics solely as an extension of traditional 
aesthetics. Nancy’s ontology is nevertheless rooted in the Heideggerian perspective of Being, and is thus 
seemingly opposite to an Anglo-American approach, which is the sort of ground that Everyday 
Aesthetics seems to rely on. This paper will be divided into three parts: first, I discuss what separates 
Everyday Aesthetics from the European approach – Heidegger included – and why this rupture is 
legitimate. Secondly, I  present what I  consider to be the strongest philosophical points that Everyday 
Aesthetics puts forward. Finally, I  show why Nancy’s  work, in its specific way of challenging Western 
thought, can make a considerable contribution to Everyday Aesthetics. | Keywords: Everyday Aesthetics, 
Jean-Luc Nancy, Ontology, Quotidian, Touch
1. Having to Leave (European) Tradition (Very Much) Behind
Even though I  agree that Everyday Aesthetics (EA) already possesses the 
background and the tools necessary for its explorations, and that these 
explorations are pertinent enough to be the issue to focus on (e.g. the 
environmental effects of the choices we make based on aesthetic preferences 
and regarding our everyday objects (Saito, 2010)), I  also believe that a  more 
manifest contrast to what has been previously done in aesthetics and in 
philosophy in general is not at all futile and can only play in favour of EA. Such 
a  contrast would indeed help, first, to better outline EA’s  specificity, so  that 
EA’s  ‘objects’ are not merely seen as ‘something new’ that aesthetics has 
‘absorbed’ through the enlargement of its boundaries. Secondly, it may 
contribute to disclosing more discerningly EA’s  conceptual richness. In this 
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way, EA could be understood, not as merely offering additional ‘subjects’ to 
discuss, but as the possibility of calling into question what we traditionally 
understand as aesthetics. Thirdly, it may serve us to detect and thus avoid 
unneeded remnants of the tradition. 
EA and Jean-Luc Nancy’s work do have a  few points in common, one of them 
being the fact that EA takes into consideration the ‘lower sense’ of touch, and 
touch is undoubtedly a central notion in Nancy’s philosophical proposal. They 
appear however to share something more essential. Both EA and Nancy seem 
to adopt the same philosophical stance towards a particular denial, a manifest 
exclusion, that has been applied by European thinking to everydayness and the 
ordinary, a  stance that, from my perspective, informs both EA’s  and 
Nancy’s approaches. In short, in EA, or at least in some of its variants, and in 
a more explicit and developed manner in Nancy, what we find is not simply the 
discussion of this or that subject, but the call for a  shift in philosophical 
thought. 
1.1 A General View
When considering the conceptual conditions required for its development, one 
could argue that EA, by being focused on the aesthetic experiences that take 
place within the ordinary, not only had to perform a  deliberate and radical 
rupture with traditional aesthetics but also with the European approach to 
Being in general. In other words, what EA can unfold is much more complex 
and far-reaching than the already rich debates it generates within aesthetics. 
What it unfolds goes further since it concerns the manner in which the 
(European) philosophical tradition in general conceives – or has conceived up 
to very recently – of existence itself. To put it (very) briefly: the European 
approach, in aiming to reach what is considered to be the realm of truth, has 
persistently chosen to distance itself from the immediate and the familiar 
presence of things, i.e. the realm of the everyday. Now, such a  depiction of 
European philosophical history – an overly complex and heterogeneous 
history of well-known disputes, and thus, of disparate perspectives and 
methods – is certainly a generalization that, to say the very least, lacks rigour. 
Nevertheless, when it comes to the main European referents, namely, those 
whose work has shaped in greater extent than others the path, the contours, 
the ground, the contents and the style of philosophical thought, it is not 
completely incorrect to recognise a  somewhat recurrent dismissive attitude 
towards the immediate and the everyday. Focusing on this particular 
dismissal, let us name a very few examples. First, Plato’s rejection of aesthesis 
not only as a  mode of perception but more importantly as that which is 
perceived by our senses – in a  word, Plato’s  rejection of the objects that 
circulate in the immediacy, and this immediacy itself; second, Descartes, who 
– as he confesses in his Meditations – had to persuade himself to discredit 
what he saw, touched and surrounded him, and determined what he perceived 
through his senses as ontologically dependent and thus subsidiary, in sharp 
contrast to an autonomous res cogitans; finally, Hegel’s  distinction between 
Wirklichkeit in a  proper sense and what we usually but wrongly call ‘reality’, 
i.e. the external world as it surrounds us with its materiality but also our 
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1 It has been claimed that Hotho imposed his own views on his edition of Hegel’s 1823 lectures 
on the philosophy of art, yet it is also true that the Introduction is regarded as a reliable 
Hegelian direct source, since in contrast to the majority of the other segments of Hegel’s 
notebooks (i.e. short and isolated sentences), the introduction was formulated in an integral 
and stylistically polished manner (Gethmann-Siefert, 1998, p. XXXI). 
2 I am following the pagination of the Gesamtausgabe. 
3 To name just a few: Cause (Ursache) and origin (Ursprung), fabrication (Erzeugung) and 
production (Herstellung and Hervorbringung), exactitude (Genauigkeit) and rigour (Strenge), etc.
internal world (Hegel, 2015, 2Ho).1 (Interestingly, this very distinction is 
formulated when presenting his philosophy of art). In short, it could be argued 
that a  persistent (albeit multifaceted) conceptual tendency has been 
underlying the ‘European approach’, thus explaining why certain ‘things’ have 
been regarded as philosophically pertinent, and contrastingly, why others have 
been ontologically and epistemologically devalued. 
As we all know, one of the most – if not the most – explicit and radical efforts 
to shift from this philosophical tradition was Heidegger’s Being and Time (and 
evidently his following publications continued that same path), where it is 
explicitly asserted that “we should raise anew the question of the meaning of 
being.” (Heidegger, 1978, p. 1)2 Now, Heidegger not only goes back to the 
fundamental question of the sense of Being. In this major shift that his 
thought undertakes, he also takes into consideration exactly what the tradition 
neglected: everydayness. Hence, the question arises: what did this 
Heideggerian radical approach that aimed to overcome the philosophical 
tradition mean for the comprehension and treatment of the everyday? 
1.2 Heidegger and the Place of Everydayness in the Destruction of the 
History of Western Ontology
One of the several informative examples in Heidegger’s work of how in order to 
properly think philosophically we have to go past the everyday and the 
immediate, is his radical distinction between the ‘surrounding world’ (Umwelt) 
and the ‘shared – or common – world’ (Mitwelt). The former is limited to the 
(measurable and quantifiable) physical space and the totality of on-hand 
entities that we encounter in everyday life. Umwelt hence corresponds to an 
ontic comprehension of the world. Conversely, Mitwelt concerns only Dasein 
and thus coincides with the proper (eigentlich) manner of being-in-the-world 
(which is not simply being ‘within’ the world) and being-with-one-another 
(Miteinandersein). In other words, Mitwelt corresponds to an ontological grasp 
of the world. Consequently, even though for Heidegger Being cannot be 
understood independently from the world, the world he is thinking about, the 
one that is part of the ontological structure of Being, is not the world as we 
perceive it in our quotidian way of being. 
Such a  distinction between Umwelt and Mitwelt – which is far from being the 
only distinction in Heidegger’s writings between notions apparently close but 
profoundly unalike in an ontological level3 – rests on, and thus also enables, 
the ontological lessening of the Umweltdinge or ‘environmental things’, 
i.e.,  that which composes our everyday concerns, the mere things and their 
mere presence, that which we perceive with our senses, that which we can 
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4 It goes without saying that scientific truth (laws, explanations), as something that does not 
correspond to the mere description of the immediate surroundings, is another matter.
5 I am here paraphrasing Yuriko Saito’s introduction to her Everyday Aesthetics (Saito, 2007, 
p. 1).
touch. Subsequently, even though, with Heidegger, everydayness (Alltäglichkeit) 
went from being overlooked to earning a  place in philosophical thinking – 
hence, some sort of philosophical ‘dignity’ – it did so  solely as a  strategy, as 
a  way for thought to ‘simply’ let the world be and unveil itself, instead of 
rushing to impose on it our (usual) categories. Taking everydayness into 
consideration certainly didn’t equate to “leap right away over that domain of 
things in which we know ourselves [to be] immediately at home” (Heidegger, 
2018, p. 145). Hence, everydayness is in Heidegger chiefly a method, and thus 
a  means (it is also a  way for Heidegger to distinguish himself from the 
tradition). Everydayness does therefore earn a  place in Heidegger but only as 
a  starting point that has to be later abandoned in favour of something 
belonging to another ontological order. It can thus be said that 
Heidegger’s dismantling of metaphysics did not amount to a withdrawal from 
the proclivity for conceiving truth as something not to be found in the 
immediate presence. In other words, Heidegger’s  approach, as those of his 
predecessors, continued to (philosophically) disqualify what takes place within 
the ordinary in the manner as it takes place ordinarily.4  
Even though Heidegger is not the subject of this paper, reviewing some of his 
terminology associated with the renewal of the question of Being serves as 
a  significant reminder when developing EA’s  theoretical ground: when 
affirming finitude, it is not enough to take as the starting point the finitude (or 
the ordinary), as opposed to the infinitude (or the out-of-the-ordinary). First 
and foremost, one has to remain within it. As we shall see later on, some 
EA’s  accounts propose to acknowledge the extraordinary in the ordinary, as 
a way to make everydayness philosophically relevant. Such a perspective is not 
only unnecessary, but does a disservice to EA’s interests.
1.3 The Pervasiveness of Significance
EA rightly drew attention to the fact that traditional aesthetics had neglected 
a  whole and undeniably critical dimension of our aesthetic experience: our 
aesthetic interactions and responses to the objects and matters that constitute 
our everyday life.5 Nevertheless, if aesthetics has disregarded certain objects 
and experiences, we should also notice that ‘plain’ existence has suffered from 
the same intellectual indifference, or what is more, discredit. The inclusion or 
the omission of certain modes of existence (by ontology and/or by 
epistemology) is not by any means simply a  matter of taste, merely 
a preference for certain subjects over others. That disregard is on the contrary 
rooted in an ontological disqualification. Was the neglect of the everyday 
philosophically legitimate? 
Being in the immediate surroundings as entities that are simply there among 
other entities is a  mode of being. Furthermore, and no matter how this 
observation may humble our particular way of being as humans, that simple 
mode of being is the most basic, i.e. the most rudimentary and the primordial 
92NATASHA LUNA MÁLAGA From Everyday Aesthetics to Rethinking Existence
6 To some degree, I am borrowing this idea, to which I shall come back later on, from Nancy 
(2000, p. 9). 
mode of being, and, by extension, the shared way of being.6 To rephrase it in 
terms closer to Heidegger, we can say that there may be a privileged entity (at 
least from the human perspective of language, sense-making, self-
determination and other considerations of the sort), which is of course Dasein, 
but this ‘favoured’ way of existing does not rest on a special ontological status. 
Or as Jean-Luc Nancy would put it: “the ontological difference is null” (Nancy, 
2007, p. 71). On that account, not only aesthetics is pervasive, but being is as 
well, as redundant and as self-evident as this assertion may seem. Is it however 
really so evident?
If the philosophical tradition before Heidegger seems to have proceeded as if it 
were possible to conceive Being independently from time, the world and the 
others – hence, some sort of ‘overexistence’ – Heidegger, on the contrary, posits 
time as the horizon for the understanding of Being; the world as the way of 
Dasein’s way of being; and being with others as coessential to Dasein. Another 
manner of ‘overexisting’ nevertheless seems to permeate this new approach. 
Being in its ‘authentic’ (eigentlich) sense exceeds what simply is. And I call it 
an ‘excess’ because what the other entities experience as being, time, world and 
‘with’ is also possible for Dasein. Dasein can indeed experience them in that 
way and as a  matter of fact, it frequently does (Dasein’s  inauthentic way of 
being). This way of being is a  possibility for Dasein. Dasein, however, is also 
concerned by another way of being which is only Dasein’s possibility, whereas 
for the other entities this particular way of being is impossible. 
There is also an excess in the sense that that which defines Dasein is not simply 
the sense of Being that is characteristic to it but also what is closer to the 
proper understanding of Being in general. In other words, Dasein is not only 
that entity for whom the sense of Being is an issue (which distinguishes itself 
from other entities). Dasein’s  authentic way of being is what better exposes 
what something really is. Accordingly, Zeitlichkeit is not the ordinary time, 
Being-in-the-world is not simply being-within-the-world, and the ‘Mit’ from 
Mitsein cannot be understood as any kind of ‘with’, i.e., a  mere spatial 
contiguity, for it is not enough to be next to each other (Nebeneinandersein) to 
properly be with another. The latter, evidently, is only possible for Dasein – and 
only within its proper way of being – which is what allows the passage from the 
Mitsein to another fundamental trait of Dasein, the dangerous telos that is the 
shared destiny (Geschick). To put it briefly, there are reasons to suggest that, 
with Heidegger, European thought went from one type of ‘overexistence’ to 
another. In other words, Heidegger put finitude on the forefront but only as 
a  (privileged) access route to something that in the end revealed itself to be 
another type of infinitude. 
If going back to ontology is justified, it is because EA is not only a  matter of 
aesthetics. To put it another way, the way we think of Being and existence 
determines how we develop aesthetics. It is indeed not a  coincidence that as 
happens with ‘being’, ‘aesthetic’ – the adjective, not the theory – in its core is 
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art-centred criteria. Other articles have already identified and analysed the main variants of 
EA (cf. Dowling, 2010; Ratiu, 2019). 
also something very basic, and that it is the manner in which its theoretical 
evolution was conducted that detached it from what is simply on-hand. 
Moreover, by trying to present the philosophical pertinence of everydayness 
not as an intention but as an equally legitimate way of existence, one of the 
aims is to make possible for EA’s  legitimacy not to rely on some sort of 
aesthetical or ethical voluntarism, on a, however well-intentioned, injunction. 
Some EA’s  accounts indeed suggest that we should promote moral activity 
(Irvin, 2008, p. 44) or that the ordinary should be seen as a source of aesthetic 
wonder (Formis, 2010, p. 8). However, there are stronger approaches to EA.
2. Why I Prefer EA’s ‘Strong Version’7
2.1 Because of the ‘History’ of Aesthetics
When questioning Sherri Irvin’s  interest in the acknowledgment of how 
pleasurable some ‘insignificant’ private experiences are, Christopher Dowling 
rightly reminds us of Kant’s  distinction between agreeableness and beauty 
(Dowling, 2010, p. 228). That there are ‘minor’ experiences that are pleasurable 
is undeniable, but should we call them ‘aesthetic’? Dowling’s main concern is 
to draw attention to the possible danger of “trivializing what counts as the 
aesthetic” (Dowling, 2010, p. 226). And partially, I agree – as Kevin Melchionne 
would do  too: examples such as Irvin’s  are “strikingly banal 
observations” (Melchionne, 2011, p. 439). I  do  not agree, however, with 
Dowling’s premise – a supposed core concept of the aesthetic (Dowling, 2010, 
p. 226). Even less do  I  agree with his way of reading Kant, whom he heavily 
references in order to formulate what constitutes this core, and therefore the 
criteria that – according to him – must be taken into account when 
determining what has a proper aesthetic value; all of which is used to call into 
question some of EA’s  claims. Is there thus a  key principle that determines 
what is and what is not ‘aesthetic’? As Dowling’s article suggests, this question 
concerns EA’s  general pertinence but more importantly, how far can EA go. 
Now, Kant is undeniably a  decisive philosopher, but is his contribution in 
aesthetics so unequivocal?
Since it is mostly because of his first Critique that he gained such a prominent 
place in the history of philosophy, we should not minimise the fact that, before 
reflecting on the a priori principles pertaining to the aesthetic judgment, Kant 
used the term ‘aesthetic’ in a manner that had nothing to do with art or beauty. 
Moreover, Kant underlined at the time that the use of ‘aesthetic’ for matters of 
‘taste’ was grounded in a failed hope (elevating the criteria for the estimation 
of the beautiful to a  science). Consequently one had to desist from using 
‘aesthetic’ for those other matters and – as he did for some years – reserve its 
use to epistemology. What I want to point out is quite simple: that particular 
meaning of ‘aesthetic’ – the adjective that depicts our immediate experience 
and contact with the world – is still valid to this day. Why is this relevant? 
As mentioned before, Yuriko Saito’s focus is on our aesthetic interactions with 
the objects and matters of our everyday life, not on art. Not to mention the fact 
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that she is rather explicit about the need of separating ‘aesthetic’ from 
‘art’ (Saito, 2017, p. 1). She even calls for EA’s  autonomy from art-centred 
criteria, and is certainly not concerned about an approval from aesthetics in its 
restrictive sense. It could be said then that her conception of what ‘aesthetic’ is, 
is closer (certainly, not identical) to the meaning Kant gives it in his first 
Critique than to what ‘aesthetic’ has come to mean today. Certainly, things are 
not that simple. Saito’s concerns are not purely limited to the immediate, the 
routinary and the material, but also consider the fact that what circulates in 
this immediacy exerts on us through our senses – here, we are still within the 
limits of the ‘basic’ sense of the aesthetic – an attraction, which is closer to the 
other sense of the aesthetic. In other words, some degree of ‘beauty’ plays 
a  role in Saito’s  account. Nevertheless, even if that ‘attraction’ relied entirely 
on beauty, the matter in hand would still be beauty and not art. And since we 
were discussing Kant, if we were to omit his first Critique and focus only on his 
third one – the first half, that is – to a certain extent we could claim the same. 
Kant’s  concern when examining this ‘new’ sense of ‘aesthetic’ was neither 
exclusively nor primarily art, but ‘beauty’. Furthermore, although aesthetic 
judgments are about empirical objects, what ‘aesthetic’ describes is the 
subjective side of such experiences, not the qualities of the objects, i.e. what can 
be evaluated, debated upon and normed. The latter are closer to judgments of 
knowledge, which Kant explicitly distinguishes from aesthetic ones, something 
Dowling seems oblivious of. Also, the universal validity (or ‘universal 
communicability’) claimed by those judgments – unlike Dowling’s  way of 
presenting it – does not refer to a  set of universal “established 
conventions” (Dowling, 2010, p. 229). Such conventions or norms would not be 
of an a  priori nature. In other words, the matter of ‘communicability’ is not 
intended to produce tools and norms so  that we can “engage critically with 
others” (Ibid.). The §33 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment is rather clear on 
that subject. As a  matter of fact, a  pure aesthetic judgment, i.e., an aesthetic 
judgment in its proper sense, is one that judges forms without resorting to 
concepts, which also explains Kant’s preference for natural beauty over artistic 
beauty (i.e. beauty that is created in accordance to rules). 
To summarize, Kant’s  third Critique is not intended as a  contribution to our 
‘critical’ contemplation nor to our ‘critical’ exchanges about artworks. And yet 
– always with Kant as his source – Dowling reiterates that an appropriate 
aesthetic judgment implies having tools and norms, so  as to elevate our 
discourses and debates about art. In fact, it could be suggested that the interest 
that lies in (the first half of) Kant’s third Critique, not only surpasses art, but 
also beauty, inasmuch as the feeling of beauty appears to be a  glimpse of 
a  wider issue: a  particular rapport we have with the surrounding world, one 
that is neither exhausted by knowledge nor by moral imperatives. 
Now, this does not mean that there is not a history of aesthetics. Yet, instead of 
a ‘core’ concept, what this history rather unveils is a  flux of agreements and 
disagreements, with some approaches certainly being more eventful than 
others. However, every philosophical ‘event’, perhaps precisely because of its 
magnitude, seems to have been quite rapidly followed by alternative 
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8 Even then, what followed was not an homogeneous path. The focus on beauty was not 
replaced by a focus on art. Both Schelling and Hegel reserved a central spot for beauty, but 
took it to another level. ‘Nature’, on the other hand, received a different treatment from each. 
If in general, ‘nature’ was finally given more credit, in Hegel it lost almost all philosophical 
dignity. And it was Hegel’s approach that prevailed over those of his contemporaries.
9 In other words, it was within European intellectual development that a restrictive tendency 
came into play. I therefore disagree with Saito when she singles out the twentieth-century 
Anglo-American aesthetics as the one that, because of its narrowness, sees in EA the “opening 
of a new frontier” (Saito, 2017, p. 1). It is true that Saito does not mention a ‘European 
approach’ in those pages. She does however specify the Anglo-American approach as being 
restrictive, and, contrastingly, refers to the Greeks and also to Baumgarten, i.e. the Europeans, 
as an example of a broader conception of the aesthetic.
interpretations, oppositions, and even new major shifts. And a major shift did 
indeed take place, a  development that did refine major concepts and restrict 
the discipline’s  scope. However, that shift took place with the emergence of 
‘Philosophy of Art’, that is, when aesthetics was deemed either insufficient or 
unsuitable for the new philosophical ambitions regarding art.8 This new period 
was inevitably much more conscious of the tradition that preceded it, and 
subsequently chose much more carefully which subjects to include and which 
concepts to use, and all in the name of the ‘dignity’ of the discipline 
(philosophy as a  whole) and of the new understanding of art (narrowing the 
contents suitable for ‘great art’). Nevertheless, this shift didn’t pertain solely to 
philosophy of art.  It was rather a  manifestation of how the academic sphere 
as a whole embarked on a more ‘serious’ path where ‘plain everydayness’ had 
little to no place.9 
2.2 Because of Its Potential to Undermine Some Lasting Assumptions of 
the Tradition
For Yuriko Saito – one of the main exponents of EA’s  ‘strong version’ – the 
philosophical pertinence of EA seems to be, above all, the series of 
implications that objects and matters of everyday life have in our lives since of 
course our lives are not only ours. Our lives are indeed not limited to a private 
sphere but, quite contrarily, have considerable consequences (e.g., of an ethical 
and environmental type) for other people’s  lives and for the world in general. 
To put it in a  different way, Saito’s  research does not have as a  central 
argument that there is an extraordinary dimension within the ordinary. As 
a matter of fact, she is rather aware of the theoretical danger of such a claim: 
“by making the ordinary extraordinary and rendering the familiar strange, 
while we gain aesthetic experiences thus made possible, we also pay the price 
by compromising the very everydayness of the everyday” (Saito, 2007, p. 50). 
Indeed, arguing that there is an extraordinary dimension in the ordinary would 
amount to falling again in the trap of making the out-of-the-ordinary, which 
has also been regarded as the out-of-this-world, the criterion for philosophical 
legitimacy. And as I have already underlined, more important than making the 
ordinary the starting point, is to remain in it, that is to say, to keep the 
everyday in its everydayness. 
In what could be the opposite end of EA’s theoretical spectrum, Barbara Formis 
certainly stresses how embedded in routine and thus how ordinary our daily 
experiences habitually are, and how uninterrupted these ordinary experiences 
are by the extraordinary (Formis, 2010, pp. 7-8). However, despite emphasising 
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this clear manifestation of finitude, Formis does not remain within the limits 
of the latter, and does the complete opposite. She characterises the occurrence 
of those repetitive and meaningless experiences, i.e. the fact that they actually 
happen without being interrupted (that they are possible everyday), 
as extraordinary, and what is more, as a miracle (Ibid., p. 8). This, she clarifies, is 
not a celebration of banality. However, even though a celebration of banality is 
certainly not needed, stressing how pervasive banality is would be 
intellectually more stimulating than appealing to words such as ‘miracle’. What 
we perceive in Formis is our perennial need for significance, for some sort of 
transcendence, i.e., precisely what has nourished and justified the neglect of 
everydayness. And neither Saito nor Jean-Luc Nancy are afraid of the fact that 
existence can present itself in a trivial manner. 
Another reason why I prefer EA’s ‘strong version’ is because its main concern is 
not simply the appreciation of the private experience (in itself and for itself). If 
Dowling sees Sherri Irvin’s  account as problematic in that it trivializes 
‘aesthetics’, my concern is rather how trivial Irvin’s  argument appears to be. 
Irvin seems to merely acknowledge that our everyday experiences are “replete 
with aesthetic character” (Irvin, 2008, p. 29). She notices indeed that many of 
her experiences, perhaps all of them, are of sensuous and pleasurable 
character. She acknowledges that she is there in a  familiar environment, 
existing as a singular Being yet intertwined with everything around, directly or 
indirectly touching and being touched (for seeing, hearing and smelling are 
ways of being reached by), experiencing and interacting with colours, forms, 
sounds, movements, volumes, etc. And because she is inter-acting with 
different entities (or parts of them) and these in turn inter-act with her – by 
the way, these entities can be anything around us, not just entities especially 
suited for contemplation – it is safe to say that we constantly and inevitably 
shape and are shaped by the world. It is beyond our choice. To be honest, 
however, this is not her argument. It is the way I present her series of examples 
(cf. Irvin, 2008, p. 31) with a  little help from Jean-Luc Nancy. By themselves, 
Irvin’s examples are mostly a description of a few of her recurrent behaviours 
and how these are a source of personal satisfaction. That is, her analysis is not 
about how we are deeply intertwined with the world, but how I  nourish my 
world. Later in her paper, the segment of her argumentation centred on 
the  moral reasons for her claims does not go past an invitation to develop 
a more satisfying relation with what we already have, which at the very most 
constitutes a moral recommendation. 
Finally, perhaps I  am overestimating this version of EA, but from my 
perspective, there is a (potentially substantial) difference in the fact that Saito 
doesn’t limit her sights to neither the isolated traits of isolated objects nor to 
the isolated ‘I’ going through a  flow of sensations. Rather, she sets her 
attention on how the traits that we get from an object X that we touch and use 
on Y, exert an influence on our decisions and thus on our actions, and therefore 
on the network that we are and that we are in. It is not then so much about the 
(everyday) objects in themselves, nor about us feeling satisfied with ourselves 
(through the private and pleasurable insignificant experiences). It is more 
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about the circulation of it all, and how this circulation is aesthetic. In this 
sense, Saito’s  account leaves the door open for further explorations, whereas 
the accounts centred primarily on private enjoyment or on how the ordinary is 
actually extraordinary stray us away from this other understanding that is 
opened up by a more radical approach to EA. 
3. Jean Luc Nancy’s Ontology (or Keeping Existence within Finitude)
Just as he highlights how pivotal Heidegger’s  work has been for Western 
philosophy, as well as for his own thought, Jean-Luc Nancy also explicitly 
stresses Heidegger’s  shortfalls (Nancy, 2008b, p. 5). These shortfalls, however, 
as Nancy underlines, are not exclusive to Heidegger. On the contrary, they 
permeate the whole of Western thought (Ibid.). Nancy’s own work could hence 
at least partially be read as a response to those shortfalls; thus, as a conscious 
drifting away from the tradition. Throughout his oeuvre, the recurrence of 
some particular concepts (‘singular plural’, ‘touch’, etc.) and the specific way of 
treating some familiar notions (‘community’, ‘art’, etc.) could be interpreted 
as  a  call to undertake a  turn in our philosophical path. As a  matter of fact, 
Nancy explicitly underlines the urgency for such a  shift (Nancy, 2000, p. xv). 
Notwithstanding this shift, Nancy’s  approach remains a ‘European approach’: 
he does not abandon the often criticised ‘European’ way of being particularly 
technical in his terminology. His thought unfolds through the pages in 
a  somewhat opaque way. Nor does he ever discard ontology. Rather Nancy 
makes the question of the sense of Being the fundamental one. In what could 
be considered his most important work – 1996’s Being Singular Plural – Nancy 
clearly states that this book’s  ambition is to redo the whole of ‘first 
philosophy’ (Ibid.). One should not, however, be fooled by this expression, 
which certainly echoes an old concern but most importantly, a traditional way 
of thinking and thus of disregarding certain ways of being. It has indeed to be 
noted that Nancy’s  ontology is profoundly rooted in what the tradition, 
contrary to him, predominantly either dismissed or devalued: presence. 
3.1 Presence (and the Other Sense of Sense)
Here are a  few examples of Nancy’s  main ideas on the subject: being is the 
being of an entity and nothing other (Nancy, 2007, p. 71); (as quoted earlier) 
“the ontological difference is null” (Ibid.); the world is just present and this 
presence does not differ from anything (Ibid.); “a  world is nothing that is 
outside existence” (Nancy, 2000, p. 29). Consequently, and in clear contrast to 
Heidegger, in Nancy there is no privileged entity when it comes to ontology; 
likewise, being-in-the-world equates to being-within-the-world. 
Through these and a  variety of other assertions, Nancy stresses finitude, one 
that seems to be in need of being repeatedly underlined given our ‘natural’ 
propensity to look elsewhere and not here or to make of what we encounter 
next to us something other than what presents itself. By privileging presence, 
Nancy diminishes the predominance of ‘meaning’ in our understanding of the 
world and of things in general (he does not, however, nullify meaning nor he 
invalidates it). In other words, in Nancy’s  thought, the fundamental sense of 
‘sense’ is not meaning but what goes through the senses. And it is indeed 
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a  going-through, a  circulation: passages from one entity to another; human, 
not human, ‘natural’, manufactured, etc. The consequence is no small matter: 
it is the space between the entities and the ‘touching’ that goes through it, that 
exposes existence more than time, more than meaning, and more than the 
entities in themselves (i.e. isolated). Hence, our (rudimentary) relation with 
the world, our being-in-the-world, our understanding of it, is aesthetic. Or, to 
rephrase it, the aesthetic comprehension of things is the comprehension of 
things. In any case, whatever significance, meaning, discourses or norms we 
can construct, all of them rely on presence, they come ‘after’ presence 
(although, in this attempt to drift away from the tradition, we should find 
alternatives to the habitual thinking in terms of ‘before’ and ‘after’ as if there 
was something ‘behind’ and ‘preceding’ everything else). An inability to trust 
presence has however shaped our perception of the world. We see, we touch, we 
are touched, we go through things. Despite all this, “we have to seek assurance 
for it. That the thing itself would be there isn’t certain” (Nancy, 2008, p. 5). If 
someone were to retort that Nancy wrote that sentence not to talk about our 
dealing with entities in general but quite exclusively with respect to the body – 
the book I took that quote from is titled Corpus – it must be reminded that for 
Nancy, the body is not a ‘particular’ entity: “The ontology of the body is ontology 
itself: being’s in no way prior or subjacent to the phenomenon here. The body 
is the being of existence » (Ibid., p. 15). Such a  claim shows how far Nancy 
intends to go when rethinking ontology, for the body has notably been 
devalued by the tradition, ontologically, epistemologically and morally. 
Could such claims be read as a  trivialization of ontology? From a  certain 
perspective that remains faithful to the tradition, certainly yes. However, 
I  want to focus on another possible objection to this insistence on presence. 
An objection that could be considered legitimate, particularly when combined 
with the claim that there is no ontological difference. Indeed, one may argue 
that such ideas could lead to social and political indifference and inaction, 
e.g.  not identifying ourselves as responsible to elaborate a  plan of action, 
initiate it, to carry it through, etc. Nancy is nonetheless clear that emphasising 
presence does not equate to surrendering to some sort of ‘presentism’ (Nancy, 
2017, p. 123). On the contrary, by underlining the ontological primordiality of 
what surrounds and touches us, by stressing that this world is the only world, 
that being is being-with-others (any others), ontology cannot but be political 
(and consequently, neither indifferent nor passive). However, expressed in this 
way, it might seem that what forces us to redo ontology is a need (for instance, 
a political urgency) or some sort of good intention, and thus not a  legitimate 
philosophical re-evaluation of Being. When analysing Nancy’s  proposal in 
detail, however, this redoing proves to be not only needed but also possible, 
and since possible, necessary. Western’s  thought has missed a  fundamental 
trait of being: the ‘with’ that is structurally essential to being (Nancy, 2008b, 
p.  5). Being is being-with, fundamentally, and thus, all the time, every time. 
Furthermore, unlike Heidegger, Nancy’s  ‘with’ concerns all entities, not just 
humans. It is partially through the development of what entails the being-with 
that, in Nancy, the political – and, by extension, the social and the ethical – 
reveals itself as constitutive of Being. Consequently, it proves to be not 
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a separate and external dimension from the (supposedly) primordial one of the 
individual, i.e. something to resolve afterwards or in a  complementary way 
(Nancy, 2000, p. 38). How is this pertinent to this article’s  concerns? First, 
because one of EA’s concerns is the ethical dimension of the pervasiveness of 
the aesthetic in our everyday life. Second, because it encourages us to reflect 
on the potential reach of EA. Nancy’s  ontological approach paves the way to 
thinking beyond the acknowledgment of the agreeable moments of our private 
experiences; beyond the ‘self’, the ‘subject’, and even 
‘intersubjectivity’ (a notion that, more or less, still privileges the ‘subject’); and 
beyond the consideration of our life experience as humans and our connexion 
to other humans. Finally, it also allows us to rethink our relation with simple 
things and with the world in general, outside the enduring perspective of the 
‘higher’ and ‘lower’ senses, of the ‘meaningful’ and the ‘merely instrumental’.
3.2 Touch, the Highest Sense?
Trying to go past the criterion of ‘significance’ as one of the decisive ones 
within ontology, discussing ‘touch’ should not be a matter of ‘higher’ or ‘lower’. 
If touch plays a central role in Nancy’s understanding of Being, it is because it 
not only exposes the basic and rudimentary way of being, it is that basic way of 
being. 
As focused as it is on meaning, philosophy seems to have lost track of this 
other sense of ‘sense’, the basic sense, when in fact, the sense of the world is that 
sense, since what the world presents to the touch is not “a mere exteriority of 
[an] impenetrable thing” (Nancy, 1997, p. 11). To put it another way, sense 
“does not signify” (Ibid., p. 10), “sense is touching” (Ibid., p. 63). And it is 
because thought is touched by existence (by the world) that thought creates 
meaning. 
Given our ‘bad habits’, Nancy warns us of the obvious risk in all of this: making 
of this ‘basic’ sense “a superior signification” (Ibid., p. 10), i.e. going back to our 
intellectual (mal)practice of oversignifying, thus exalting the sensory to 
a  caricatural extreme (Nancy, 2008, p. 23). In other words, the sensory has to 
remain sensory. In this sense, Nancy’s  ontology could therefore be useful in 
addressing one of AE’s  theoretical issues: preserving everydayness as 
everydayness. This, however, does not mean that thought and meaning do not 
play a  critical role. What it does mean is that there is no thinking without 
touching (Ibid., p. 37). Besides, since existence touches thought and, in turn, 
thought touches existence, we are always producing-sense (both senses), and 
therefore, making-the-world. Once again, it is our (rudimentary) aesthetic 
relation with the world, the base of our making-the-world. Nancy’s  ontology 
could therefore also be useful – once more – when working on the ethical 
implications of the everyday.   
3.3 The Quotidian
If Heidegger identified the quotidian with the inauthentic, the undifferentiated 
and the statistical, Nancy conversely understands what manifests itself in the 
quotidian as an “affirmation of the world” (Nancy, 2000, p. 9). The quotidian 
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exposes existence, in that existence has no essence and is not a  substance. 
Heidegger, as the tradition before him, seems to have been moved by a ‘natural’ 
distrust, ontologically lessening what presents itself in an ordinary way 
(e.g.,  a  stone, that which has no ‘World’). However, what is it that legitimises 
the everyday to be considered as a  lesser manifestation of what is? Nancy 
contends the opposite: “[existence’s] intimate discord, its polymorphy and its 
polyphony” (Ibid.) is exposed by the everyday, through the everyday, in the 
everyday. Nancy is rather explicit about it: “the humble layer of our quotidian 
experience contains a  fundamental ontological attestation” (Ibid., pp. 8-9). 
That fundamental attestation is that Being is being singular plural, 
i.e.  existence’s  singular and material manifestations are not simply 
‘multiplicity’, something whose ‘truth’ is to be found in a  non-material 
‘totality’ elsewhere. Also, that there is not one origin, but a plurality of them, 
happening at each moment, each one affirming the world, this world. The 
quotidian is thus not the trivial nor the inauthentic. Any entity is, and its way 
of being is the shared way of being by any other. Furthermore, the absence of 
an ontological difference does not mean that we are indistinct from one 
another, for every entity is singular (hence the discordance, the polymorphy 
and the polyphony) and remains so, but always as a being-with. 
Another idea that shows that Nancy not only welcomes what the tradition 
would consider as trivial but actually takes it into serious consideration, is his 
suggestion that thought itself – i.e. not just the ephemeral mental 
acknowledging of some random perception but philosophical thought – is 
intruded, and thus shaped, by the ‘trivial’. Nancy notices that not only cities, 
but also the countryside, have increasingly become louder (cars, machines, 
tractors, trains); radios and TVs are never too far away, cell phones are ringing 
here and there. Thinking happens throughout this network, and is consequently 
“surprised, shaken, called or summoned from very far or very near” (Nancy and 
Lèbre, 2017b, pp. 13-14). To put it another way, existence – in its plainest sense 
– touches thought. As a  general rule, in Nancy, nothing is free from being 
affected by the ordinary. Not only during thought’s  process, but also because 
any object can stimulate thought to apply itself to its exercise: to start thinking 
(Nancy, 2002, p. 55). In other words, thinking – a process that happens within 
(this) time and (this) space, and hence, is entangled in matter – not only is 
interrupted, but shaped by the way the everyday unfolds. In short, the way 
Nancy works ontology is a door to the everyday. 
3.4 Art
Art may seem absent here but it is certainly not absent in Nancy’s  body of 
work. Nancy’s general idea of art brings art closer to the broader sense of the 
‘aesthetic’. According to him, art is the most telling exposure of existence. Art 
makes more evident what constitutes existence: senses, gestures, matter, 
entanglements, lines, shapes, volumes, sounds, touching, forming, dislocating, 
the using of tools, the choosing of tools, randomness, deciding, doing, and 
so on. Art lies primarily in its operation(s) more than in the finished artwork. It 
lies in the plurality of aesthetic exchanges that do not (because they could not) 
exclude the non-artistic and the banal. In short, the aesthetic should not be, 
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and actually is not, dominated by ‘Art’. It is the arts that are formed by the 
aesthetic, and are therefore determined by it.
3.5 Conclusion
One random and trivial experience may not tell us much about anything. 
Nevertheless, the fact that existence manifests itself as if it were primarily 
constituted of the singular, the ephemeral, the sensory and the ‘insignificant’ is 
worthy of our philosophical attention. This should not entail, however, that we 
should make a  totality of the singular, a  necessity of the contingent, and 
so  forth. More than the trivial, the problem seems to lie in our need for 
‘meaning’ and in how far we carry this need. Indeed, this need seems to play 
a  considerable role when our intellect ontologically and epistemologically 
dismisses certain things that, even though they are, are not in a  certain way. 
The neglect of the everyday might therefore rely not on its limitations, but on 
our limitations regarding our conception of Being.
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